



26th October, 2017, Belgrade, Serbia
organized by
Institute of Economic Sciences, Belgrade and Faculty of Economics, Niš



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**SUSTAINABLE GROWTH IN
SMALL OPEN ECONOMIES**

ENVIRONMENTAL TAX AND COMPETITIVENESS OF EUROPEAN COUNTRIES THROUGH THE LENS OF PORTER HYPOTHESIS

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


Introductory considerations

- ⌘ In accordance with Porter hypothesis (PH), the paper investigates empirical proofs of positive relation between current environmental taxes on the example of 34 European countries and their innovation capacity.
- ⌘ The aim of the paper is to examine the connection between a) environmental taxes as one of the forms of strict ecological regulation in European countries and b) innovation capacity of the countries expressed by the values of sub-index GCI - Innovation and sophistication factors.
- ⌘ In accordance with the proposed model this would imply testing of the so-called weak part of PH.



Porter's hypothesis - PH




PH assumes positive effects of:

- regulation on eco-innovation
- eco-innovation on competitiveness

Environmental taxes impact on innovations


(as component of GCI)



Total environmental taxes as percentage of total revenues from taxes and social contributions (excluding imputed social contributions)

GCI (WEF) framework

(and GCI.C subindex of
Innovation &
sophistication)





Research

The research is focused on:

1. Europe countries group (32 countries);
2. Time period 2006-2016 (last decade)
3. Time lag of +1 year for depend variable

Scope of research 2006 - 2016






Model

* Environmental taxes as percentage of total revenues from taxes and social contributions (excluding imputed social contributions)

⌘ The basis for defining innovativeness is WEF's GCI.C subindex (GCI framework consist of 3 sub-indices), while the level of environmental regulations is quantified by the Environmental taxes*, according to the World Bank and Eurostat data.



* X4 is 1 for crisis years

* X5 is 1 for post- transition countries



The main hypothesis

H0: Increasing levels of national environmental tax: Energy taxes (X1), Transport taxes (X2) and Other environmental taxes (pollution, resources, ...) (X3) has a desirable positive and synergic influence on the exogenous variable – GCI Innovativeness & Sophistications subindex (Y).

$$Y = a_0 + a_1 * X_1 + a_2 * X_2 + a_3 * X_3 + (a_4 * X_4 + a_5 * X_5)$$

- ⌘ Y (the dependent variable) – *GCI Innovativeness & Sophistications*;
- ⌘ X_1 (independent variable 1) – *Energy taxes* ;
- ⌘ X_2 (independent variable 2) – *Transport taxes* ;
- ⌘ X_3 (independent variable 3) – *Other environmental taxes (pollution, resources, ...)*;
- ⌘ X_4 (dummy variable 3) – *Time dummy (economic crisis)*;
- ⌘ X_5 (dummy variable 3) – *Market dummy (historical background of countries free market)*
- ⌘ a_i ($i = 0 - 5$) – are constants acquired from multiple regression process.



Research background




Total environmental tax revenue by type of tax, EU-28, 2002–15 (billion EUR)

Big disbalance of ecological taxes




Total environmental tax revenue by type of tax, EU-28, 2002–15 (billion EUR)





Total environmental tax revenue 2015 in %


A diverse share of
environmental taxes






Research results

Descriptive statistics for X1, X2 and X3





Descriptive statistics for X3 before and after logarithmic transformation (X vs. $\text{Log}(100 \cdot X)$)






Descriptive statistics for X_1 , X_2 , X_3

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
X1-EnergyEcoTax	320	5.35	1.48	2.66	9.40
X1-TransportE~x	320	1.62	1.09	0.13	5.40
X1-Log100xOth~x	320	1.22	0.62	0.00	2.27


Multicollinearity	X1	X2
X1- EnergyEcoTax	1	
X2- TransportE~x	-0.34	1
X3- OtherEcoTax	0.19	0.17





Descriptive statistics for Y – GCI Innovation and sophistication (1-7 best)


Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Y- InnSophGCI	320	4.38	0.78	2.96	5.8




Single regression




X_1 (Energy environmental taxes) –
GCI Innovation and sophistication;



X_2 (Transport environmental taxes) –
GCI Innovation and sophistication;




X_3 (Other: pollution, resource...;
environmental taxes) –
GCI Innovation and sophistication;



Single regression



EU28 + Serbia, Norway, Iceland





Multiple panel data linear regression

Random-effects GLS regression

Number of obs = 320

Group variable: rb

Number of groups = 32

R-sq: within = 0.1135

Obs per group: min = 10

between = 0.5302

avg = 10.0

overall = 0.5214

max = 10

Wald chi2(5) = 73.37

corr(u_i, X) = 0 (assumed)

Prob > chi2 = 0.0000

Y - InnSophGCI	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P>z	[95% Conf. Interval]
X1 - EnergyEcoTax	-0.031	0.011	-2.830	0.005	-0.052 -0.031
X2 - TransportEcoTax	0.043	0.021	2.030	0.043	0.001 0.043
X3 - Log100xOthEcoTax	0.091	0.046	1.950	0.051	-0.001 0.091
X4 - DummyEcoCris	-0.074	0.016	-4.550	0.000	-0.106 -0.074
X5 - DummyHistory	-1.079	0.193	-5.580	0.000	-1.458 -1.079
_cons	4.785	0.149	32.070	0.000	4.493 4.785
sigma_u	.516				
sigma_e	.113				
rho	.954 (fraction of variance due to u_i)				

Hausman fixed vs. random test



---- Coefficients ----

	(b)	(B)	(b-B)	$\sqrt{\text{diag}(V_b - V_B)}$
	fixed	random	Difference	S.E.
EnergyEcoTax	-.0279188	-.0308781	.0029593	.0006633
TransportE~x	.0514064	.0430829	.0083235	.004253
Log100xOth~x	.0847077	.09053	-.0058223	.0129243
DummyEcoCris	-.074394	-.0742909	-.000103	.

b = consistent under H_0 and H_a ; obtained from xtreg

B = inconsistent under H_a , efficient under H_0 ; obtained from xtreg

Test: H_0 : difference in coefficients not systematic

$$\chi^2(4) = (b-B)'[(V_b - V_B)^{-1}](b-B)$$

$$= 6.85$$


$$\text{Prob} > \chi^2 = 0.1443$$

<https://www.princeton.edu/~otorres/Panel101.pdf>


Multiple regression



EU28 + Serbia, Norway, Iceland



3D for X1, X2, Y



The obtained results refer to the conclusion that environmental taxes have statistically significant but contradictory influence of the sub-index **GCI - Innovation and sophistication** factors in European counties during the selected time interval. While **Energy taxes** have a slightly negative influence, the other two independent variables a) **Transport taxes** and b) **Other environmental taxes** (but in transformation $\log(100 \cdot X)$) have somewhat stronger positive effect on the innovation component of global competitiveness as a dependent variable.

$$Y_{it+1} = -0.031 X1_{it} + 0.043 X2_{it} + 0.091 X3_{it} - 0.074 X4_{t+1} - 1.079 X5_i + 4.785 + c_i + u_{it}$$

$$R^2 \text{ overall} = 0.5214$$

Conclusion

- ⌘ The results of research at this stage show that it is possible to generate the initial model for explanation of the effect of environmental taxes on the innovation potential of European countries.
- ⌘ Nevertheless, this phase is characterised by a relatively small time series as well as a small granulation of the presented environmental taxes as independent variables.
- ⌘ Results are preliminary and further research is necessary for generalisation of conclusions in accordance with PH.
- ⌘ The confirmation of this hypothesis can be significant for the creators of economic policies, especially in the light of current ecological and also wider aspirations towards the sustainable development (sustainable development policies in EU).



“The conservation of natural resources is the fundamental problem. Unless we solve that problem it will avail us little to solve all others”

Theodore Roosevelt



The environment is
everything that isn't me.

Albert Einstein



Thank you for your attention

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